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experimentally investigate whether auctioning off the right to play a prisoner’s dilemma 
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significantly more subjects cooperate in the modified PD than in the status quo PD 
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between the modified and the status quo game. 
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Experiments on prisoner's dilemma and other public goods games typically reveal 
cooperation rates higher than the equilibrium prediction in the first round and a decrease 
over time, leading to cooperation rates closer to the equilibrium prediction in the final 
round of the game. This pattern applies to repeated games as well as to repeated one-shot 
games.1 In this paper, we investigate whether auctioning off the right to play a prisoner’s 
dilemma game may stop this trend. The paper explores whether the choice between two 
versions of a prisoner's dilemma game with the same Nash equilibrium but different out-
of-equilibrium payoffs provides a means of sorting, allowing players with different 
preferences to self-select into the version of the game they prefer.  
The existing experimental findings on prisoner's dilemma and public goods games 
overwhelmingly suggest the existence of heterogeneous players, the two most important 
being conditional cooperators (i.e. subjects who cooperate if others cooperate as well) and 
egoists (i.e. money maximizers).2 Most recently, Fischbacher et al. (2000) showed the 
relevance of conditional cooperation in a public goods game, finding that the majority of 
their subjects were conditionally cooperative (with a strong correlation between own and 
other contributions).3 However, despite the prevalence of conditional cooperators, high 
cooperation rates cannot be sustained over time. As conditional cooperators' behavior 
depends on what others do, the existence of non-cooperative types induces a downward 
spiral.4  
We investigate whether an auction for the right to play a modified version of the game 
rather than the status quo version separates cooperators from defectors. In the modified 
game the cost of unilateral cooperation is lower, but the Nash equilibrium remains the 
same as in the status quo game. We choose this specific change in out-of-equilibrium 
                                                                 
1 See, for example, Andreoni (1988), Andreoni and Miller (1993), and for surveys, Davis and Holt (1993) and 
Ledyard (1995).  
2 See, for example, Brandts and Schram (forthcoming), Croson (1999), Keser and van Winden (forthcoming), 
and for a recent survey, Fehr and Gächter (2000). Individual heterogeneity in preferences does not exclude 
the possibility of errors. Rather, studies testing the relevance of errors and of other-regarding preferences in 
public goods games find that both are present, see Anderson et al. (1998), Andreoni (1995) and Palfrey and 
Prisbrey (1997). 
3 48 percent of the subjects were  conditionally cooperative and 32 percent could be classified as purely 
selfish. The remaining 20 percent of the subjects displayed an unusual, not easily identifiable pattern of 
behavior. 
4 Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show theoretically that cooperation cannot be obtained in equilibrium even if the 
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payoffs as not only the theory but also earlier experimental evidence (e.g. Ahn et al. 1998) 
suggest that when games are assigned, such a change in payoffs does not affect behavior. 
In addition, it captures important aspects of real life mechanisms employed to sort 
employees, customers and insurees. As the cost of unilateral cooperation is lower in the 
modified version than in the status quo version, the change in the payoff structure 
represents an insurance mechanism by (partially) compensating the cooperator in case his 
or her counterpart defects. Therefore, the modified game is prima facie more attractive to 
players who want to cooperate than to money maximizers. Apart from sorting schemes 
used by insurance companies for example, clubs often employ similar mechanisms to 
induce self-selection. E.g., high membership rates together with certain privileges can deter 
some people and attract others who value these privileges highly enough. 
The experiment is designed as follows: We run two versions of a one-shot two-person 
prisoner's dilemma game with the same unique Nash equilibrium. Before playing the 
game, each subject individually decides which version of the game he or she wants to play. 
The right to participate in the "insured" instead of the status quo version of the game is 
sold in an nth-price auction. The subjects who win the auction play the game according to 
the modified payoff structure while for all others the status quo version remains valid.  
We test for the effect of two central contextual variables, the number of rights available 
to play the modified PD and the number of periods played after an auction. The intuition 
for this is straightforward: If there are more rights available than conditional cooperators 
present, full separation of player types is impossible. Even if all cooperators opted for the 
modified game, some egoists would be able to take advantage of them, inducing the 
downward spiral. If there are fewer rights available than conditional cooperators present, 
on the other hand, sustainable sorting seems possible. We vary the number of periods 
played after an auction to test for different expected values of playing the insured version 
of the game. The more periods subjects can spend in the "safe(r) haven", the higher their 
bids should be.  
This is a novel experimental design. In contrast to earlier related experimental studies, 
our design investigates the choice between two versions of a game instead of between 
playing and not playing a game. The latter choice situation has been extensively studied for 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
conditional cooperators are in the majority. 
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bargaining and coordination games.5 The exit experiment by Orbell and Dawes (1993) 
comes closest to our design. In their experiment, subjects could choose between playing a 
prisoner’s dilemma game (where a player’s profits were only positive if the other player 
cooperated, otherwise he or she made a loss) and exiting the game (with payoff zero). The 
authors report higher cooperation rates with an exit option than in the standard PD and 
argue that this supports sorting: Egoists opt out as they underestimate the probability of 
cooperation while cooperators choose to play the PD.  
In our experiment, assuming type-contingent beliefs is not necessary to account for 
sorting. Rather, rational expectations can induce players to select the version of the game 
they prefer. Also, our design allows for a better test of the sorting hypothesis because we 
observe the behavior of those who lost the auction, whereas in the design of Orbell and 
Dawes (1993) those who exit have no choice to make. We find that in the first period of 
the auction treatments significantly more subjects cooperate in the insured game than in the 
status quo version. Paying for the right to participate in the insured game seems to provide 
an opportunity for self-selection. However, sorting is incomplete. In most sessions there is 
some cooperation in the status quo game and some defection in the insured game. The 
auction price does not correspond to the differences in expected values between the insured 
and the status quo game and the price predicted in a sorting equilibrium is not reached in 
the laboratory.  
While the laboratory environment seems comparatively simple, the bidding decision is 
cognitively quite demanding. In order to bid rationally, subjects would have to hold correct 
beliefs about the cooperation rates in both games. With two player types, conditional 
cooperators and money maximizers, this requires knowledge of the distribution of types in 
both games after the auction. We find that while the first-period cooperation rate is 
significantly higher in the insured version than in the status quo version of the game, there 
are still many cooperating subjects who are "exploited". The experience of being the 
"sucker" induces the disappointed cooperators to stop cooperating.6 We find that 
                                                                 
5 In bargaining games, proposer competition was analyzed by Güth and Tietz (1986) and responder 
competition by Prasnikar and Roth (1992). Van Huyck et al. (1993) and Cachon and Camerer (1996) allow 
players in a coordination game with Pareto-ranked equilibria to opt out of the game. Cooper et al. (1993) 
investigate the effect of an outside option in the battle-of-the-sexes game. Related to these exit-experiments 
is a public goods game by Erhart and Keser (1999) in which subjects could form new groups.  
6 For early experimental evidence in psychology, see Brubaker (1975). For more recent economic 
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cooperating subjects whose counterpart defected in the first period are equally as unlikely 
to ever cooperate again as subjects who defected in the first period. Only after mutual 
cooperation are first-period cooperators willing to cooperate again in future rounds. This 
dynamic leads to a decrease in auction prices and cooperation rates in the insured game 
over time.  
In the next part II of our paper, we outline the experimental design. In section III, we 
derive predictions. Section IV reports the experimental results and Section V discusses 
their relevance. Section VI concludes the paper. 
 
II Experimental Design 
Our design consists of a two-person, one-shot prisoner's dilemma game, which is 
employed in two versions. Table 1 presents payoff table A, the status quo version, and 
payoff table B, the insured version of the game. Numbers represent actual payoffs in cents. 
Defection is the unique Nash equilibrium in both versions, which only differ in the out-of-
equilibrium payoffs for unilateral cooperation. The payoffs were presented to our 
experimental subjects in a matrix form; no normative frames were used.7   
 
Table 1:  
Payoff Table A 




350 ; 350 
 
 




500 ;    0 
 
 
150 ; 150 
 
 
Payoff Table B 




350 ; 350 
 
 




500 ; 100 
 
 
150 ; 150 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
experiments, Isaac et al. (1989).  
7 For the experimental instructions, see appendix A. 
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The game was repeated five times, which was common knowledge. Subjects were 
randomly matched with a new counterpart in each period8 and privately informed about 
their individual results after each period. Four different treatments were conducted: The 
control treatment I where games A and B were assigned to the participants, as well as three 
different auction treatments. In the latter, we varied the number of periods played after an 
auction as well as the rights available to play game B. Our choice of the number of rights 
available to play game B was influenced by prior results on the number of cooperators 
present in prisoner’s dilemma games. Reviewing the literature revealed a striking 
consistency: Typically, cooperation rates of about one third are found in the first rounds of 
one-shot prisoner’s dilemma games.9 We label treatments with more rights to play game B 
available than expected cooperators as "large groups B" and those with about equally as 
many rights available as "small groups B".  
In treatment conditions II and III, auctions were repeated in every period, in condition II 
with large B-groups (approx. two thirds of the participants) and in condition III with small 
B-groups (approx. one third of the participants). We chose the group sizes so that in 
condition II, B would consist of more players than the number of cooperators we expected, 
and in condition III, B would be small enough to consist of cooperators only. In treatment 
IV, also a small-group design (approx. one third of the participants), an auction was only 
run in the first period, after which subjects remained in the respective games for periods 2 
to 5 (subjects were randomly re-matched in each period as above). An overview of the 
experimental design is presented in table 2.  
 
                                                                 
8 See Andreoni and Miller (1993) for this repeated one-shot design in two-person prisoner's dilemma games.  
9 See for one of the earliest prisoner's dilemma experiments, Dawes et al. (1977) who report a cooperation 
rate of 33 percent in an 8-person PD and, most closely related to our design, Andreoni and Miller (1993), 
who find a cooperation rate of about 35 percent in the first period. Cooperation rates depend on the social 
distance between the subjects and between the subjects and the experimenter. We guaranteed complete 
anonymity similar to a double-blind design (see Bohnet and Frey 1999a and b).  
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Table 2: Experimental design 
Treatment conditions N n(A) n(B) 
      
I. Control 48   
Assigned A  24  
Assigned B   24 
    
II. Repeated auction, B large  72   
Auction 1 26 10 16 
Auction 2 24 10 14 
Auction 3 22  8 14 
    
III. Repeated auction , B small  78   
Auction 4 30 20 10 
Auction 5 18 12  6 
Auction 6 30 20 10 
    
IV. First round auction, B small  54   
Auction 7 28 18 10 
Auction 8 26 16 10 
 
An nth-price sealed bid auction was used to elicit individuals’ willingness to pay for game 
B. Even though experimental evidence does not fully support the theoretical predictions 
(Vickrey 1961), comparatively stable behavior is reported in private and common value 
second-price auctions (Kagel 1995). However, the auction employed here neither qualifies 
as a private value nor as a common value auction. Our bidders do not know the value of 
the item to themselves with certainty as the value depends on other participants' choices in 
the game. Allowing for subject heterogeneity, the value of the item is also not the same to 
everyone: One’s own preferences and expectations about other people's behavior 
determine bidding. Van Huyck et al. (1993), who used an auction to sell the right to play a 
game for the first time (eliciting individuals’ willingness to pay for a coordination game), 
call it a "game form auction". They state that "the value of the object being auctioned is 
determined by the strategic interaction of the owners and this strategic interaction can 
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depend on the price generated in the auction." (Van Huyck et al. 1993: 493). 
Auction sessions were conducted as follows: After the participants had read the 
instructions and questions had been answered, we ran a practice auction where subjects 
were assigned their true private valuation for a hypothetical good beforehand.10 We then 
started with the experiment: Each participant had to indicate his or her bid; the auction 
price was determined and written on the blackboard. Subjects were allocated to game A or 
game B depending on their bid, randomly paired with another player in the same version of 
the game and informed about which game they were playing. Then each subject had to 
decide whether to cooperate or to defect; finally everybody learned about his or her 
earnings in the current period. In treatment conditions II and III, this procedure was 
repeated five times; in treatment condition IV, the auction was only conducted in period 1 
and players remained in either game A or B for all five periods. 
The experiments were conducted with students from various universities in the Boston 
area. Participants were paid a show-up fee of $5. The experiment was conducted 
anonymously and took approximately 45 minutes. After the experiment, participants were 
paid in cash and earned $15 on average (including the show-up fee). Subjects were 
identified by code numbers only and care was taken that neither other subjects nor the 
experimenter could observe private decisions. 
 
III Predictions 
We derive our reference prediction from standard game theory. If all subjects are rational 
money maximizers, and if this is common knowledge, the equilibrium prediction is 
identical in all our treatment conditions: Nobody cooperates in either version A or version 
B of our game, and nobody is willing to bid anything for the right to play version B rather 
than version A in the auction treatments.11 However, as discussed above, there is much 
empirical evidence for standard prisoner's dilemma games, such as the one employed in 
our control treatment, suggesting that about one third of the players cooperate in the first 
                                                                 
10 Participants were asked to indicate their willingness to pay for one of three identical hypothetical goods on 
a piece of paper, which we collected. We wrote all the bids on the blackboard and demonstrated how a 
second price auction works: The three highest bidders would each win one of the identical hypothetical 
goods and pay the price that the fourth highest bidder bid. In case of a tie, a random device was used to 
determine who won the auction, and the price announced before the tie occurred had to be paid. 
11 Due to backward induction, this prediction follows even if we acknowledge that random matching does not 
 9 
period of one-shot public goods games with binary choices.  
Taking these findings into account, the standard game theoretic prediction formulated 
above is modified. We propose a simple but straightforward definition of types: As money 
maximizing rational individuals should not cooperate in one-shot prisoner's dilemma 
games, we consider all players (and only those) who cooperate in the first period to be 
conditional cooperators. Both, conditional cooperators and egoists, are willing to pay a 
positive price to participate in version B rather than version A of the PD, given that they do 
not assume that only subjects of their own type are present12 and given that egoists do not 
assume that the likelihood of being paired with a cooperator is the same in both versions of 
the game (in which case they bid zero cents). If subjects expect that there are both money 
maximizers and conditional cooperators in the group, sorting is possible.13  
Assuming a constant proportion of cooperators of one third, we make a point prediction 
and a comparative statics prediction for first-period behavior: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
produce a "true" one-shot environment. 
12 If this is common knowledge, everybody bids zero cents and egoists defect and cooperators cooperate in 
both games. This is an extreme version of the "false consensus effect" (Dawes 1989). 
13 Apart from the informal sorting hypothesis presented here and the definition of types based on observed 
behavior in the first period, a sorting equilibrium can be constructed with fully optimizing players. However, 
the existence of a sorting equilibrium in the one-shot game and its properties critically depend on the 
subjects' beliefs about the definition and distribution of types and on the number of rights available to play B. 
Therefore we only sketch the equilibrium in this footnote, without formally testing it.  
Suppose that conditional cooperators derive an extra utility of δ>150 from both players cooperating (for a 
similar model, see Bolle and Ockenfels 1990 for mutual cooperation and Cooper et al. 1996 for unilateral 
cooperation), that subjects hold correct beliefs about the distribution of types and that the number of rights to 
play game B is larger than the number of cooperators in the group. Then, there exists a strictly positive price 
at which cooperative types pay the auction price and cooperate while egoists are indifferent between paying 
the price for B in order to exploit the cooperators and not paying anything to receive the non-cooperative 
payoff in game A for sure.  
Assuming a constant percentage of cooperators of roughly one third, which is common knowledge, allows 
us to calculate at which auction price conditional cooperators are sorted from egoists. If two thirds of the 
subjects play game B and all conditional cooperators sort themselves into game B, then egoists are willing to 
bid [EV(B)-EV(A)]Def = 0.5*500 + 0.5*150 - 150 = 175 cents. Cooperators are willing to bid [EV(B)-
EV(A)]Coop = 0.5*(350+δ) + 0.5*100 – 0= 225+0.5δ. Thus, any price between 175 and 225+0.5δ induces 
sorting of player types (with the equilibrium price being 175), leading to higher cooperation rates in game B 
than in game A.  
If the number of rights to play game B is smaller than the number of cooperators, the auction price must 
be such that conditional cooperators are indifferent between playing game B, meeting another cooperator 
with certainty and paying the price, or playing game A and meeting another cooperator only with a small 
probability. If one third of the group plays game B, then egoists are maximally willing to bid [EV(B)-
EV(A)]Def = 500 - 150 = 350 cents. Cooperators are willing to bid [EV(B)-EV(A)]Coop = 350+δ, i.e. the 
equilibrium price when there are more cooperators in the group than rights to play B is 350+δ. 
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Hypothesis 1: 
(a) In period 1, nobody cooperates in game A but all B-players cooperate in the small B 
treatment and half of the B-players cooperate in the large B treatment.  
(b) Independent of the size of group B, first-period cooperation rates in versions B are 
higher than in versions A of the game in the auction treatments. No such difference 
between versions A and versions B exists in the assigned treatment. 
 
Subjects know the auction price and are informed about their individual earnings after 
each period, i.e. both money maximizers and conditional cooperators can learn and adapt 
their behavior accordingly. In small B-groups, complete sorting with only conditional 
cooperators playing game B is possible. In such a case, full cooperation could be sustained 
over time. In large B-groups and with only one third cooperators present, sorting can never 
be complete. Conditional cooperators whose counterpart defects in the current period stop 
cooperating, increasing the number of defecting subjects in the next period and thus 
resulting in a downward spiral over time.14 Assuming that one third of the group are 
conditional cooperators, we predict for behavior over time:  
 
Hypothesis 2: 
(a) A subject who cooperates in the first period is more likely to cooperate again in later 
periods if his or her counterpart cooperated and less likely if his or her counterpart 
defected in period 1. 
(b) Overall-cooperation rates are stable in the small B-auction treatments and decrease 
over time in the assigned and in the large B-auction treatments. 
 
Finally, individual bids should reflect the expected value of playing version B rather 
than version A. In order to evaluate how much better it is to play version B rather than 
version A, a participant has to form beliefs about what strategy his or her counterpart will 
choose, consider that sorting may occur, and choose a strategy. In particular, every subject 
has to compute the expected payoff from playing B minus the expected payoff from 
                                                                 
14 A similar spiral has been observed in continuous-choice public goods environments where conditional 
cooperators' contributions do not quite match the average contributions of others, see Fehr and Schmidt 
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playing A given his or her strategy. If there are more rights to play game B than 
conditional cooperators present, the auction price in the first period is equal to the expected 
payoff difference between game A and game B for defectors. Conversely, if there are 
fewer rights to play B available than conditional cooperators present, the auction price is 
equal to the expected payoff difference for cooperators. Even if bids do not reflect the true 
expected value initially due to the complexity of the task, we expect them to converge 
towards it as subjects learn and update their beliefs about other players’ behavior over 
time. 
We derive point and comparative statics predictions for first-period behavior and for 
behavior over time:  
 
Hypothesis 3: 
(a) Auction prices reflect the expected value of playing game B minus the expected value 
of playing game A.  
(b) First-period auction prices are higher, the larger the expected value of playing version 
B rather than version A is. In particular, auction prices are higher, the smaller group B 
is and the more periods of version B are played after the auction.15 
(c) Over time, auction prices converge to the expected value of winning the auction. 
 
 
IV Experimental Results 
In the following, the main findings are presented. 
 
Observation 1: First-period cooperation  
(a) Cooperation rates in version B of the game are close to 50 percent in all auction 
treatments.  
 
In large B-groups, first-period cooperation rates are exactly (or close to) 50% in all auction 
sessions while in small B-groups, cooperation rates in none of the auction sessions 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
(1999). 
15 This prediction holds assuming that one third of the group are conditional cooperators, sorting takes place, 
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approach 100% (see table 3, Appendix B). The point prediction of hypothesis 1(a) is only 
partially supported. 
 
(b) Cooperation rates are higher in version B than in version A of the game in the auction 
treatments but not in the control treatment.  
 
First, note that there are no significant differences between the overall-cooperation rates in 
the control treatment and the eight auction sessions (Fisher’s Exact tests, p>0.10).16 This is 
consistent with the sorting hypothesis. At the same time, substantial differences between 
first-period cooperation rates in versions A and B can be observed in the auction 
treatments. For a graphic representation of cooperation rates in games A and B see figure 1 
below. (Table 3, appendix B, reports the cooperation rate for each session separately.) In 
all auction treatments, but not in the control treatment, cooperation rates in versions B are 
significantly higher than in versions A. A Fisher’s Exact test yields p=0.547 for treatment 
I, p=0.000 for treatment II, p=0.025 for treatment III, and p=0.046 for treatment IV.17  
Hypothesis 1(b) is supported. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
and both is anticipated by the subjects. 
16 Comparing the overall cooperation rate of each auction session with the cooperation rate in the assigned 
games, no significant differences can be found: A-1: p=1.00, A-2: p=0.431, A-3: p=1.000, A-4: p=0.805, A-
5: p=0.167, A-6: p=0.805, A-7: p=0.626, A-8: p=0.799. 
17 At the level of individual auction sessions, the difference between versions A and version B is significant at 
a 10%-level in the three sessions of treatment I with large B and in one of the sessions of treatment IV: A-1: 
p=0.087, A-2: p=0.024, A-3: p=0.022, A-4: p=0.115, A-5: p=0.638, A-6: p=0.115, A-7: p=0.050, A-8: 
p=0.664. The data is pooled as there are no significant differences between the sessions in each treatment.  
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Treat I Treat II Treat III Treat IV
Games A Games B
 
 
 Observation 2: Cooperation over time 
(a) There is evidence for both types of players, egoists and conditional cooperators. 
 
In our experiments, 86 out of 252 subjects cooperated in the first period of the game. One 
out of the 86 continued to cooperate in all the remaining four periods. Most other first-
period cooperators' behavior is contingent on their counterpart's type: 75 percent of the 
cooperators meeting another cooperator in the first period (N=32) are willing to cooperate 
at least once again in the future. On the other hand, only 24 percent of the cooperators 
meeting an egoist in the first period (N=54), are willing to ever cooperate again in the 
remaining four periods. Of the 112 money maximizers who meet another defector in the 
first period, 29 percent cooperate at least once in periods 2 to 5 (and 24 percent of the 
egoists meeting a cooperator in the first period (N=54) are willing to cooperate in later 
rounds). First-period cooperators thus do not behave differently in later periods than first-
period defectors if their counterpart defects but are much more likely to cooperate again if 
their counterpart also cooperates (Fisher's Exact Test, p<0.01), supporting hypothesis 2(a). 
Table 4 in (appendix B) presents the results for the four different treatments.  
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(b) Overall-cooperation rates in all treatments and in all games decrease over time. 
 
The opportunity to self-select into groups of similar types does not prevent conditional 
cooperators from defecting in later rounds. Figure 2 presents the experimental data 
graphically.18 The decrease in cooperation rates in the assigned treatment I is very similar 
to the decay in auction treatments II and III. The differences between the overall-
cooperation rates in the control treatment I and the two auction treatments II and III are not 
significant in almost all periods (chi2-tests: p>0.1 for all treatment comparisons in all 
periods, with the exception of Treat I-Treat III in period 2 where we find a marginally 
significant difference with p=0.099).  Finally, no difference between treatments II and III 
can be observed (chi2-tests: p>0.1). Incomplete sorting in both large and small B-groups 
induces a downward spiral. Hypothesis 2(b) is only partially supported. 
Moreover, the decrease in cooperation is similarly strong in treatment IV with a single 
auction and in treatments II and III with an auction in each period. The differences 
between the overall cooperation rates in the three auction treatments are not significant in 
almost all periods (chi2-tests: p>0.1 for all treatment comparisons in all periods, with the 
exception of Treat II-Treat IV in period 3 where we find a marginally significant 
difference with p=0.083). Thus, the decrease cannot be attributed to invaders, paying the 
price for B in later rounds in order to exploit the cooperators.  
 
                                                                 
18 For the data of the individual sessions, see table 3 in appendix B.  
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Observation 3: Auction prices 
a) In the first period, auction prices do not correspond to the expected value of playing 
game B minus the expected value of playing game A. 
 
Most subjects bid more than zero. Out of 204 participants in the three different auction 
treatments, only 22 subjects bid zero cents in the first period. Everybody else, i.e. 85 
percent of the participants, has some positive willingness to pay for the right to play 
version B rather than version A. First-period auction prices are higher than if subjects had 
not anticipated sorting at all. If no sorting was expected, defectors would bid 0 and 
cooperators maximally 66 cents in both auction treatments II and III (assuming that they 
expect one third of the group to cooperate). Table 5 (appendix B) shows that actual bids 
are much higher than these numbers. Hypothesis 3(a) is not supported. 
If subjects had rationally anticipated the distribution of types, first-period auction prices 
should be just equal to the expected advantage of playing B instead of A. Computing the 
expected value of B over A by using the realized cooperation rates and subtracting the 
auction price for each session yields the graphs of figure 3.19 It emerges that in the first 
                                                                 
19 For example, in the first round of A-1 the expected value of playing B instead of A for a defector is 
0.5*500+0.5*150-(0.1*500+0.9*150)=140. Note that the expected values of defectors used in figure 3 are 
lower than the expected values of conditional cooperators who benefit from the “insurance” in game B. The 







1 2 3 4 5
Treat I Treat II Treat III Treat IV
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period, the auction price is too low in treatment II (A-1 to A-3) whereas it is too high in 
treatment III (A-4 to A-6). 
 
















b) Auction prices are higher for small than for large groups B, but mean bids do not differ 
significantly. When subjects can bid for the right to play a game for 5 periods rather 
than for 1 period, auction prices and bidding differs. 
 
Table 6 (appendix B) reports the realized auction prices in all sessions. Bidding behavior 
seems very similar in treatments II (small B) and III (large B). A test comparing the means 
and the distribution of bids in the first period of treatments II and III reveals no significant 
difference between the two (Mann-Whitney test, p=0.18; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test; 
p=0.67). Assuming again that about one third of the group are conditional cooperators in 
both treatments, bids should differ as the value of playing small B (where everybody 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
B) the auction price can also be higher if there are more conditional cooperatores than rights to play B. Thus, 








1 2 3 4 5
A-1 A-2 A-3 A-4 A-5 A-6
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cooperates) is higher than the value of large B (where the probability to meet a cooperator 
is only one half). Hence, as bids do not differ, the price difference is due to the fact that the 
distribution of bids is truncated after a smaller number of bidders when B is small. 
Comparing first-period bids of treatments II and III (where an auction takes place in 
every period) with the first-period bids of treatment IV (with only one auction in the first 
period) reveals that the means and the distributions of the bids significantly differ from 
each other (for II and IV: Mann-Whitney test, p<0.001; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, 
p<0.001; for III and IV: Mann-Whitney test, p<0.001; Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, 
p<0.001). Thus, hypothesis 3(b) is not supported for the group size effect but it is 
supported for the period effect. Subjects seem to be able to figure out that bidding for the 
right to play game B for five periods is worth more than bidding for the right to play it for 
one period only. On the other hand, they do not bid more for smaller B groups than for 
large B groups. 
 
(c) Auction prices and the differences in expected values between games B and A 
converge.  
 
Figure 3 shows the difference between the expected value of playing game B and game A 
for defectors minus the auction price in each period, i.e. [EV(B)-EV(A)]Def - P.20 In the 
three sessions of treatment II (large B), auction prices start out too low, whereas in 
treatment III (small B) auction prices are too high in the beginning. Over the five periods, 
as cooperation rates decrease, subjects adjust their bids to the decreasing true value of 




We find evidence for sorting in the beginning of our experiments, with higher cooperation 
rates in the insured version B than in the status quo version A of the game. No such 
differences can be found when versions A and B are assigned. While it has not yet been 
investigated how changes in the payoff structure affect sorting in the prisoner‘s dilemma, 
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the few papers studying the impact of relative payoffs on cooperation rates in assigned 
prisoner's dilemma games support our results in the control treatment. Introducing an 
insurance mechanism in a two-person PD, which decreased the cost of unilateral 
cooperation from 40 cents to 10 cents, Ahn et al. (1998) did not find any effect on 
cooperation. Only if both the benefit of unilateral defection and the cost of unilateral 
cooperation were decreased from 40 to 10 cents, they found an increase in cooperation.21 
Schotter (1998) tested the effect of an insurance mechanism in a profit sharing game 
with two equilibria, a high effort and a low effort equilibrium. Subjects' payoffs depended 
on their own effort levels, those of the other group members and on the group incentive 
formula. Two such formulas were compared: a high-vulnerability plan A and a low-
vulnerability plan B in which a subject's payoff fell less steeply than under plan A for 
identical reductions in others' efforts. Thus, plan B compensated high effort workers to 
some degree, providing a similar insurance mechanism as was employed in our game B. 
The author found that subjects' behavior in plans A and B did not differ (unless they shared 
a common history of shirking).22  
Similarly, in our experiment the provision of an insurance mechanism by itself does not 
lead to higher cooperation rates. Only when the right to play the insured version of the 
game is auctioned off, more cooperation is observed in the insured version of the game 
compared to the status quo version. This may not come as a surprise: Privileges in clubs 
are not just randomly given to people but sold and sometimes even auctioned off.  
Still, to the best of our knowledge, nobody has found a sorting mechanism leading to 
stable cooperation rates over time yet. In Erhart and Keser's (1999) public goods 
experiment where subjects could leave their groups to form new ones, "cooperating 
subjects are on the run from less cooperative ones who follow them around." (p. 9) As 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
20 For the auction prices in the individual sessions, see table 6 in appendix B. 
21 Their average cooperation rate over all random matching treatments is also very close to ours, namely 31.6 
percent. A change in payoff structures was first studied by Rapoport (1967) who called the relative cost of 
unilateral cooperation "fear" (payoff for mutual defection minus the payoff for unilateral cooperation) and 
the relative benefit of unilateral defection "greed" (payoff for unilateral defection minus payoff for mutual 
cooperation). 
22 While subjects could not choose between plans but were assigned to them, the author affects expectations 
about others' likelihood of choosing high effort levels using a different mechanism: Prior to playing the profit 
sharing game, subjects either participated in the minimum or the median coordination game. While subjects 
typically managed to coordinate on the payoff-dominant equilibrium in the median game (no shirking 
experience), they typically converged to the minimum in the minimum game (shirking experience).   
 19 
cooperative subjects formed new groups, hoping to meet other cooperators, egoists 
constantly invaded and decreased cooperation rates over time. Offerman and Potters 
(2000) experimentally examined how auctioning off entry licenses (e.g. for oil drilling or 
airport slots) affects pricing behavior, also finding support for first-round sorting only. The 
most collusive players, setting the highest prices and earning the largest profits, self-
selected into the market game in the first auction. However, in later auctions, no signs of 
such a selection effect were found. Sorting, thus, was not sustainable.  
An experiment by Charness (2000) supports the relevance of sorting in a bargaining 
game. Subjects were sorted by the experimenter according to their offers in a first stage 
dictator game. In the second stage, people of the same ‘type’ were paired to play a 
bargaining game and informed of each other's type. Pairs of generous types bargained 
more efficiently than all other pairs. Even when subjects knew in advance that they would 
be sorted according to their allocation in the dictator game, this difference in bargaining 
outcomes was observed (albeit on a lower level). Knowing that one’s partner is ‘generous’ 
or, as in our experiment, that she was willing to pay a price for the insured game, seems to 
confer useful information and to encourage ‘friendly’ behavior. 
While the sorting explanation is consistent with most of our data, we want to explore an 
alternative hypothesis as well. Forward induction has been used to explain why auctions 
could lead to increased efficiency in coordination games. Van Huyck et al. (1993) and 
Cachon and Camerer (1996) allowed players of a coordination game with seven Pareto-
ranked equilibria to opt out of the game. The price for the right to play the game served as 
an efficiency-enhancing coordination device if the price was high enough to exclude 
inefficient equilibria. While Van Huyck et al. (1993) argued that in line with forward 
induction, auction prices provide a means of tacit communication, Cachon and Camerer 
(1996) showed that ‘better’ equilibria were reached even if fees were imposed. This cannot 
be accounted for by forward induction as subjects could not choose whether to participate 
or not, but suggests that they acted according to the principle of ‘loss-avoidance’.23 Cooper 
et al. (1993) investigated the effect of one player getting an outside option in the battle-of-
                                                                 
23 Similar to Cachon and Camerer (1996), Offerman and Potters (2000) report that "it is mainly the fact that 
an entry fee has to be paid rather than a selection effect that affects the outcome on which subjects 
coordinate." (p. 20). 
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the-sexes game. They also found only limited support for the relevance of signaling 
intentions about future behavior, i.e. forward induction, as players also react to dominated 
outside options. 
Despite this mixed evidence regarding the explanatory power of forward induction, it 
could have played a role in our experiments if all individuals had been conditional 
cooperators. For conditional cooperators, the prisoner’s dilemma is transformed into a 
coordination game. An auction price above 150 cents for game B helps such players to 
coordinate on the cooperative outcome in game B but not in game A. Differences in 
cooperation rates between versions A and B of the game could thus be accounted for. 
However, our data do not support such an explanation for two reasons: First, the overall-
cooperation rate is insensitive to the size of group B. Forward induction would imply that 
with large B, more subjects cooperate than when B is small. Second, auction prices in all 
sessions of treatment II are too low (below 150 cents) for a forward induction argument to 
work. Although first-period auction prices in treatment III were sufficiently high for 
forward induction, they did not result in systematically different behavior than the low 




We have run an experiment that differs from past prisoner’s dilemma studies in that our 
experimental subjects could choose between two PD payoff structures, the original game A 
and a modified version B in which the payoff from unilateral cooperation is increased. The 
right to participate in version B rather than in the original game A could be bought in an nth 
-price, sealed-bid auction. The specific design was chosen for two reasons: First, we 
wanted to provide subjects with an "institutional choice" implying that they could decide 
which version of a game they wanted to play but could not just opt out. Taking the 
criticism seriously that game theory is of limited practical relevance because it does not 
allow for individuals to change the games they play (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996), 
we tested for the implications of transforming payoff structures in the laboratory. 
Secondly, the specific change in the payoff structure, the decrease in the cost of unilateral 
cooperation in game B, was chosen in order to reflect schemes used by various 
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organizations to sort their employees, customers or insurees.  
We compare various auction treatments with a control treatment in which versions A 
and B were assigned to the subjects. After the auction, significantly more subjects 
cooperate in the modified PD than in the status quo PD whereas there is no difference 
between cooperation rates if the two versions of the game were assigned to participants. 
Individuals willing to cooperate in period 1 thus self-select into the insured version B 
while defectors bid less and play version A. Such a segmentation of types may be 
especially interesting from an evolutionary point of view as it facilitates the "proliferation 
of nice traits" (Bowles 1998: 93). 
First-period cooperators continue to cooperate if they have been paired with another 
cooperator in the first period. If their counterpart defected in the first period, the likelihood 
of ever cooperating again is as low for first-period cooperators as for first-period defectors, 
indicating that our subjects are either conditional cooperators or egoists. If sorting in the 
first period is incomplete, we should expect the dynamics of conditional cooperation to 
lead to a decrease of cooperation rates over time. This is what we observe: First-round 
cooperators who meet a defector in period 1 stop cooperating in later rounds. The decrease 
of cooperation rates makes the differences in expected values between playing version B 
and version A smaller and smaller. Auction prices reflect this trend. While we observe 
over- and underbidding in the beginning, the differences in expected values and the auction 
prices converge over time and are close to zero in the last period.  
We find that auctioning off the right to play a prisoner's dilemma game provides a 
means of sorting in the beginning of the experiment but that sorting is not sustainable over 
time. More research remains to be done in order to better understand under which 
conditions sorting can be stabilized and cooperation among those who are more inclined 
towards cooperative outcomes can be maintained. Our experiments shed light on some 
aspects of such a mechanism.  
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Appendix A: Experimental instruction for auction treatments  
Welcome to this research project!  
 
You are participating in a study in which you have the opportunity to earn cash. The actual amount 
of cash you will earn depends on your choices and the choices of the other persons in the study. At 
the end of the study, the amount of money you earned will be added to the show-up fee of $5. In 
addition to these instructions, you receive an envelope containing  
- a Code Number Form 
- a Practice Form 
- a Private Valuation Form 
- an Auction Form marked with your code number  
- a Decision Form marked with your code number 
 
What the study is about: 
The study is on how people decide. You have to make two decisions: 
 
(i) How much do you want to bid for the right to participate in a specific situation?  
The right to participate in a specific situation will be auctioned off. Situations A and B, presented 
below, only differ in the size of the payoffs. You will be asked to privately submit your bid for the 
right to participate in situation B instead of in situation A. "Participating in situation B" means that 
you will play according to payoff table B for 5 rounds, with new partners in each round. If you 
remain in situation A, you will play according to payoff table A for 5 rounds, with new partners in 
each round.  
 
The top n bidders will participate in situation B. These n bidders will have to pay the amount that 
equals the highest rejected bid, i.e. the amount that the n+1th bidder offered. The other m bidders 
who did not bid high enough will participate in situation A. The values for n and m are indicated on 
the blackboard. 
  
(ii) Which alternative do you choose in the situation you participate in? 
You and another person who is in the same situation as you are have to choose between two 
alternatives, X and Y. The payoff table tells you how much money you earn depending on what 
you choose and what the other person chooses.  
 
How the study is conducted: 
The study is conducted anonymously and repeated five rounds. Participants are only identified by 
"code numbers". In order to guarantee privacy and anonymity, do not show anyone your code 
number! You are randomly matched with another person in each round. Before beginning with the 




I. Practice: Auction for a hypothetical good: 
In this auction, 3 identical hypothetical goods are auctioned off. In your envelope you received 
your private valuation of the good. This is the amount of money the good is actually worth to you. 
Each participant may only bid for one good. Thus, the 3 highest bidders will each receive one 
good. The 3 highest bidders will pay the amount that the 4th highest bidder offered. Everybody else 
will neither receive nor pay anything.  
Please write the amount you want to bid on the ”Practice Form" and put it into the box. We will 
collect all forms and determine the 3 winners.  
If a tie occurs (for example, the 3rd and the 4th bids are equally high), a random device will be used 
to determine who will receive the good. The price to be paid is the next highest bid, in this example, 
it would be the 5th highest bid.  
In order to demonstrate how the auction works, we will write down all bids on the blackboard and 
explain how the price is determined. This is only done in the practice auction, not in the following 
real auction. You don't have to pay anything in the practice auction. 
 
 
II. Research Project:  
 
Situations A and B are represented by the following payoff tables. Tables A (B) read as follows:  
If you and the other person choose Y, each of you earns 150 cents. 
If one of the two of you chooses Y and one of the two of you chooses X, choosing Y earns 500 
cents and choosing X earns 0 cents (100 cents). 
If you and the other person choose X, each of you earns 350 cents. 
 
Payoff Table A 
Number of  
Persons choosing X 
Outcome  
for X (cents)   
number of 
persons choosing Y 
outcome  
for Y (cents) 
0  -- 2 150 
1 0 1 500 
2 350 0 -- 
 
Payoff Table B 
Number of  
Persons choosing X 
Outcome  
for X (cents)   
number of 
persons choosing Y 
outcome  
for Y (cents) 
0  -- 2 150 
1 100 1 500 




We first run the auction and determine whether you are in situation A or B. You and everyone else 
will remain in the same situation during the whole study. Once you know whether you are in 
situation A or B, you will have to decide between X and Y. You will be randomly matched with a 
new person in each round. This procedure is repeated five times. 
 
Round 1:   
We now auction off n rights to participate in situation B in the next round. The n highest bidders 
will each participate in situation B and pay the amount that the n+1th bidder offered. The m other 
bidders will participate in situation A and pay nothing. 
If a tie occurs (for example, the nth and the n+1th bids are equally high), a random device will be 
used to determine who will be in situation B. The price to be paid is the next highest bid, in this 
example, it would be the n+2th highest bid.  
Please write on the Auction Form how much you want to bid in the auction, put it into the 
envelope and then into the box which is passed around. We will privately inform you whether you 
are among the n highest bidders in this auction or not.  
 
After the auction, you know in which situation, A or B, you are. You are randomly paired with a 
person who is in the same situation as you are.  
 
Please carefully read the corresponding payoff table, A or B, before making a choice. Indicate the 
situation you are in, A or B, and your choice for Round 1, X or Y, on the Decision Form, put it 
back into the envelope and then into the box which we will pass around. 
End of round 1.  
 
We will now determine your earnings according to your choice and the choice of the other person, 
and privately inform each of you how much money you earned in this round. For this purpose, we 
will again pass the box around. Please take the envelope marked with your code number out of the 
box. It contains the Decision Form now also indicating your earnings. Do not tell or show anybody 
else your result. 
 
Round 2:  
You remain in the same situation as in round 1. You are randomly matched with a new person who 
is in the same situation as you are. Please again choose between X and Y from "your" payoff table. 
Indicate your choice for ‘Round 2’ on the decision form, put it into the envelope and then into the 
box which we will pass around. We will compute your earnings again and privately inform each of 
you how much money you earned in this round.  
End of round 2. 
 
Rounds 3-5:  
The exact same procedure as in the previous round will be repeated.  
 
END OF THIS STUDY.  
Please put the Decision Form back into the envelope and then into the box. Keep your Code 
Number Form! You will have to present your Code Number Form in order to receive your 
earnings.  
If you have any questions, please address them to Iris_Bohnet@Harvard.edu 
 




Table 3: Cooperation rates in all periods 
 
Periods 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Assig. I        A+B 
                         A 
                         B 
36% 
       42% 
       29% 
27% 
       21% 
       33% 
15% 
       21% 
         8% 
17% 
        13% 
        21% 
 8% 
         8% 
         8% 
Auct. II-1     A+B 
                         A 
                         B 
35% 
       10% 
       50% 
31% 
        0% 
       50% 
23% 
        0% 
       38% 
27% 
       10% 
        38% 
15% 
        0% 
       25% 
Auct. II-2     A+B 
                         A 
                         B 
25% 
        0% 
       43% 
13% 
       10% 
       14% 
13% 
        0% 
       21% 
 4% 
       0% 
       7%  
 8% 
     10% 
       7% 
Auct. II-3     A+B 
                         A 
                         B 
32% 
        0% 
       50% 
14% 
        0% 
       21% 
18% 
      13% 
      21% 
 9% 
       0% 
       14% 
 5% 
       0% 
      13% 
      
Auct. III-4    A+B 
                          A 
                          B 
30% 
       20% 
       50% 
13% 
        5% 
       30% 
23% 
       10% 
       50% 
10% 
        5% 
       20% 
 3% 
       0% 
      10% 
Auct. III-5    A+B 
                          A 
                          B 
56% 
       50% 
       67%     
11% 
       17% 
         0% 
11% 
        8% 
       17% 
17% 
       17% 
        17% 
11% 
        0% 
       33% 
Auct. III-6    A+B 
                          A 
                          B 
30% 
       20% 
       50% 
 7% 
       0% 
      20% 
 7% 
        5% 
       10% 
10% 
        5% 
       20% 
 3% 
        0% 
        5% 
      
Auct. IV-7    A+B 
                          A 
                          B 
43% 
       28% 
       70% 
18% 
        6% 
       40% 
11% 
        6% 
       20% 
 7% 
        6% 
       10% 
14% 
       11% 
        20% 
Auct. IV-8    A+B 
                          A 
                          B 
31% 
       25% 
       40% 
19% 
       19% 
       20% 
 4% 
       6% 
       0% 
 8% 
       0% 
      20% 
 8% 
       0% 




Table 4: Players’ first-period contingent behavior over time 
Treatments Period 1: Players'  
Experiences 
Periods 2-5: Share of players who 
cooperate at least once (or more)  
      
I: Assigned games C meets C (N=8) 
C meets D (N=9) 
D meets D (N=22) 





II: Multiple large B-
auctions 
C meets C (N=8) 
C meets D (N=14) 
D meets D (N=36) 





III: Multiple small 
B-auctions 
C meets C (N=10) 
C meets D (N=18) 
D meets D (N=32) 





IV: Single small B-
auction 
C meets C (N=6) 
C meets D (N=13) 
D meets D (N=22) 








Table 5: First-period average bids (in cents) 
Treatments Egoists’ bids  Cooperators’ bids  
      
Treatment II (large B) 110 (N=50) 236 (N=22) 





Table 6: Auction prices in all periods (in cents) 
Periods 1 2 3 4 5 
      
Auction II-1 85 66 68 76 84 
Auction II-2 62 25 2 2 0 
Auction II-3 25 26 20 15 15 
      
Auction III-4 225 250 150 82 81 
Auction III-5 250 275 233 150 110 
Auction III-6 300 150 150 100 110 
      
Auction IV-7 450 - - - - 
Auction IV-8 350 - - - - 
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